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Abstract Recently in Porter v. McCollum, the United States Supreme Court, citing
‘‘a long tradition of according leniency to veterans in recognition of their service,’’ held that a
defense lawyer’s failure to present his client’s military service record as mitigating evidence
during his sentencing for two murders amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. The
purpose of this Article is to assess, from the just deserts perspective, the grounds to believe
that veterans who commit crimes are to be blamed less by the State than offenders without
such backgrounds. Two rationales for a differential treatment of military veterans who
commit crimes are typically set forth. The Porter Court raised each, stating that we should
treat veterans differently ‘‘in recognition of’’ both ‘‘their service’’ and ‘‘the intense stress and
mental and emotional toll’’ of combat. The former factor suggests there being a ‘‘social
contributions’’ or gratitude-based discount, whereas the latter factor points towards a
‘‘mental disturbance’’ discount. This Article analyzes the two accounts and raises some
doubts about both. This Article then argues that a military veteran who commits a crime
should not be blamed to the full extent of his blameworthiness, not necessarily because of his
mental capacity nor because of his social contribution, but because the State’s hand in
producing his criminality undermines its standing to blame him.
Keywords Veterans  Culpability  Posttraumatic stress disorder  Mitigation 
Punishment  Retribution  Blame  Military  Just and unjust war  War crimes

Introduction
Recently in Porter v. McCollum, the United States Supreme Court, citing ‘‘a long tradition
of according leniency to veterans in recognition of their service,’’ held that a defense
lawyer’s failure to present his client’s military service record as mitigating evidence during
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his sentencing for two murders amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.1 After
Porter, the Federal Sentencing Commission amended the Sentencing Guidelines in 2010 to
single out military service as ‘‘relevant’’ when it is ‘‘present to an unusual degree’’ despite
its general view that ‘‘prior good works are not ordinarily relevant’’ in sentencing determinations.2 Also, as American troops have started to return from Iraq and Afghanistan,
there has been a steady stream of media accounts focusing on veterans who commit crimes
after returning home3 and noting a ‘‘growing number of judges’’ who express the view that
offenders with military service backgrounds should be treated differently at sentencing
from nonveterans.4
While the Porter Court’s invocation of the ‘‘long tradition of … leniency’’ for military
veterans is not incorrect, the legal system’s treatment of this issue has not been uniform.
Some jurisdictions mandate a consideration of military service background as a mitigating
factor at sentencing; others permit it.5 Federal Sentencing Guidelines, until the aforementioned amendment in 2010, discouraged it, by stating that ‘‘[m]ilitary, civic, charitable,
or public service; employment-related contributions; and similar prior good works are not
ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted.’’6 As a general matter,
the issue is left to judges’ discretion, with some judges being more sympathetic than others
to the idea that military veterans should be treated differently.7
Neither is it the case, despite its long history and prominence, that there is a clear
understanding of normative justifications for treating military service background as a
mitigating factor. Two rationales are typically set forth. The Porter Court raised each,
stating that we should treat veterans differently ‘‘in recognition of’’ both ‘‘their service’’8
and ‘‘the intense stress and mental and emotional toll’’ of combat.9 The former factor
1

Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 455 (2009).

2

US Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5H1.11 (2011); US Sentencing Guidelines Appendix C, Amendment
739 (2011). For a recent case discussing the phrase ‘‘present to an unusual degree,’’ see United States
v. Jager, 2011 WL 831279 (D.N.M. 2011).

3

See, e.g., Erica Goode, Coming Together to Fight for a Troubled Veteran, NY Times, July 17, 2011; John
Schwartz, Defendants Fresh from War Find Service Counts in Court, NY Times, Mar. 15, 2010; James Dao,
Study Suggests More Veterans May Be Helped by Talking About Killing, NY Times, Feb. 13, 2010; Lizette
Alvarez and Dan Frosch, A Focus on Violence by Returning G.I.’s, NY Times, Jan. 1, 2009; Deborah Sontag
and Lizette Alvarez, In More Cases, Combat Trauma Is Taking the Stand, NY Times, Jan. 27, 2008.

4

Amir Efrati, Judges Consider New Factor at Sentencing: Military Service, Wall St. J., Dec. 31, 2009;
see also Hawkins (2010).

5

Hessick (2008, pp. 1116–1117).

6

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5H1.11 (2009); Hessick (2008, pp. 1119–1125).

7

See, e.g., Forgey v. State, 886 N.E.2d 16, 24 (Ind. App. 2008) (‘‘While we recognize that Forgey was
honorably discharged from the Marine Corps in 1993 and commend Forgey for his service to this nation, we
cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider Forgey’s service to be a
significant mitigating factor with respect to the instant crimes. Indeed, many of Forgey’s actions during the
commission of the instant crimes appear to be attributable to his military training. For example, Forgey
dressed in military fatigue-style camouflage clothing, duct-taped the ankle shackles and thumb cuffs
together to maintain silence, and hid on Gus’s property, undetected, for nearly 24 h before committing the
offenses. The trial court was within its discretion to conclude Forgey’s military training assisted his commission of the instant offenses and to reject Forgey’s military record as a mitigating sentencing factor.’’);
Deborah Sontag and Lizette Alvarez, Across America, Deadly Echoes of Foreign Battles, NY Times,
Jan. 13, 2008; Tim McGlone, Navy Officer Who Claimed PTSD in Child-Porn Case Gets 40 Months,
Virginia-Pilot, Dec. 12, 2009; Anne Jungen, Iraq War Veteran Avoids Prison in Bar Robbery, La Crosse
Tribune, Jan. 9, 2009. See also Grey (2012).
8

Porter, 130 S. Ct. at 455.

9

Id.
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suggests there being a ‘‘social contributions’’ or gratitude-based discount, whereas the
latter factor points towards a ‘‘mental disturbance’’ discount, bearing some resemblance to
other incapacity-based factors, such as insanity and intoxication. The ‘‘mental disturbance’’
account is frequently linked to the claim that these military veterans suffer from posttraumatic stress disorder (‘‘PTSD’’).10 Although it seems plausible that these factors are
somehow relevant, it is nevertheless frequently unclear in these discussions how such
factors fit into an overall theory of punishment.
The purpose of this Article is to come to a better understanding, from the just deserts
perspective, of the grounds to believe that veterans who commit crimes are to be blamed
less by the State than offenders without such backgrounds. Of course, there may be sound
penological reasons, such as incapacitation or rehabilitation, for the practice of giving
discounts to veterans. It may be the case that military veterans are more likely than other,
ordinary criminals to reform in settings other than prisons.11 Some have also suggested,
and put into practice, the idea of having a special court for veterans.12 This Article does not
address the wisdom of these approaches. Rather, it focuses on the question of blameworthiness—whether offenders with military backgrounds are, all other things being equal,
less blameworthy than others, and whether the State can blame them to the full extent of
their blameworthiness.
More specifically, because much of the debate in this area takes place in terms of
PTSD,13 this Article focuses on PTSD-based arguments in favor of mitigation. Although
the issue is by no means settled, this Article starts from the assumption that PTSD has the
effect of diminishing one’s capacity to control one’s own behavior and that, for that reason,
it reduces one’s culpability for conduct committed while one’s self-control is compromised
due to it. In order to justify the assumption, this Article begins with a brief discussion of
PTSD generally—what causes it, who can be subject to it, and how it is thought to be
linked to criminal behavior. The rest of the Article focuses on the limits of the PTSD-based
argument for mitigation and advances the following propositions: First, a veteran’s PTSD
does not mitigate his blameworthiness if his PTSD symptoms can be traced to his own
culpable behavior. Second, a veteran’s PTSD does not mitigate if his PTSD arises from his
acts in violation of certain jus in bello principles. Third, a veteran’s PTSD does not
mitigate if his PTSD is traced to his participation in an unjust war, unless he had actually
and reasonably believed that the war was just. Fourth, even if a veteran’s participation in an
unjust war precludes mitigation, he should not be blamed to the full extent of his
blameworthiness because the State’s hand in producing his criminality undermines its
standing to blame him. The Article ends by exploring the implications of these arguments
for the social contributions account of mitigation for offenders with military service
backgrounds.
A final caveat. The issue of a veteran’s PTSD and its contribution to his criminal
behavior may come up at either the guilt or the sentencing stage. At the guilt stage, PTSD
symptoms may be sufficiently strong to defeat a charge altogether, either by negating an
element of the offense or by establishing an element of a defense, such as self-defense or
insanity.14 At the sentencing stage, on the other hand, the PTSD symptoms and their
10

See, e.g., Giardino (2009); Hawkins (2010, p. 563).

11

Dahlia Lithwick, A Separate Peace: Specialized Courts for War Veterans Work Wonders. But Why Stop
at Veterans? Slate, Feb. 11, 2010.
12

Id.; see also Hawkins (2010).

13

See, e.g., Giardino (2009); Hawkins (2010, p. 563).

14

Grey (2012, p. 54); Hafemeister & Stockey (2010, p. 96); Sparr (1996, p. 406).
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contribution to one’s criminal behavior may be thought to be a mitigating factor.15 The
focus of this Article is on the relevance of military service as a reason to mitigate, not
acquit. That is, this Article is only about those who commit crimes with sufficient capacity
to be held criminally responsible, and it does not address situations where one’s military
service has caused a disability that is serious enough to negate criminal liability.16
PTSD and Culpability
PTSD and Criminal Behavior
Although PTSD is frequently associated with military combat, it is a mental disorder that
can arise from a variety of events: such as law enforcement,17 violent assaults generally,
terrorist attacks,18 torture, incarceration, natural disasters, automobile accidents, or even
‘‘being diagnosed with a life-threatening illness,’’ even if, for some of these events, a
person merely witnesses them happen to others or learns about their occurrence.19 PTSD
has also been associated with miscarriage, surgery, poisoning, rape, and domestic violence,20 and Battered Woman Syndrome has been considered a sub-category of PTSD.21
PTSD can cause a variety of symptoms.22 The diagnostic and statistical manual of
mental disorders (DSM) requires ‘‘clinically significant distress or impairment in social,
occupational, or other important areas of functioning’’ in order for one to be diagnosed
with PTSD, and the symptoms of PTSD can range from ‘‘persistent symptoms of increased
arousal’’ (such as ‘‘difficulty falling or staying asleep’’ and ‘‘difficulty concentrating’’) to
‘‘persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma’’ (such as ‘‘inability to recall an
important aspect of the trauma’’) in combination with a ‘‘feeling of detachment or
estrangement from others’’ and ‘‘restricted range of affect (e.g., unable to have loving
feelings),’’ to ‘‘persistent[] reexperience[]’’ of the traumatic event (such as ‘‘acting or
feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring’’).23
Among the three types of symptoms outlined in DSM, only the last one, which could
involve ‘‘dissociative states,’’ where ‘‘the person behaves as though experiencing the event
at that moment,’’ is obviously related to criminal culpability.24 ‘‘For people with posttraumatic stress disorder,’’ according to one expert, ‘‘remembering trauma feels like
reliving it.’’25 People may experience ‘‘intrusive recollections,’’26 which manifest as
‘‘flashbacks’’ in extreme cases, and such recollections are ‘‘so vivid that it seems as if the
trauma is actually happening again,’’ meaning that ‘‘the person may see, hear, smell, or feel
15

Hawthorne (2009, p. 12).

16

For a useful discussion of some conceptual difficulties concerning the distinction between full and partial
defenses, see Husak (1998).
17

Loo (1986); Mann & Neece (1990); Rivard et al. (2002); Stratton et al. (1984).

18

Brackbill et al. (2009).

19

American Psychiatric Association (2000, pp. 463–464).

20

Gold & Simon (2001, p. 507); Herman (1992, p. 49).

21

Walker (1991); Walker (1992).

22

Laufer et al. (1985); Laufer et al. (1984).

23

American Psychiatric Association (2000, p. 468).

24

Id. p. 464.

25

McNally (2003, p. 105).

26

Id.
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the original sensations while remembering the trauma.’’27 Flashbacks can occur even
among people who did not experience the traumatic events themselves; sometimes being in
a close relationship with a victim of a traumatic event, such as a murder victim, is
sufficient.28 People who are experiencing flashbacks can react physically, a phenomenon
known as ‘‘psychophysiologic reactivity.’’29 This is where extreme cases of PTSD may
produce criminal behavior.30
The link between criminal behavior and PTSD may exist in other ways, although the
exact mechanism is not always clear.31 Nevertheless, multiple pathways have been
hypothesized, and here I mention a few.32 First, people who experience traumas tend to
rely on drugs and alcohol to avoid confronting the painful memories.33 Drugs and alcohol
can in turn diminish one’s capacity to control oneself. Second, one common symptom of
PTSD is hyperarousal and sensitivity to potential sources of danger and threat.34 Third,
veterans with PTSD can have ‘‘anger regulation deficits’’ and have trouble controlling their
anger and aggression.35 Fourth, PTSD may bring about the ‘‘sensation seeking syndrome,’’
often characterized by a tendency to engage in risky activities in order to recreate the level
of arousal and excitement they experienced in combat.36 These factors, each by itself or in
combination, can lead to criminal behaviors.
Although this discussion is a very short summary of an area with an enormous literature,
the basic idea should be clear for our purposes. The question I explore in the rest of the
Article is this: assuming that the links suggested in the psychological and legal literature
between combat, trauma, and criminality are real, how should we morally evaluate veterans who commit crimes while suffering from PTSD?37
When Does PTSD Mitigate?
Assuming it is correct that PTSD can contribute to criminal activities, the question is
whether the presence of PTSD is relevant to the issue of blameworthiness. Unfortunately,
in reported cases and media accounts, sentencing judges have not always spoken clearly
about whether PTSD is relevant to sentencing, and, if so, in what way.38 However, it does
27

Id. p. 106.

28

Id. p.116.

29

Id. pp. 106, 118–120.

30

Hafemeister & Stockey (2010, p. 114).

31

Pollock (1999, p. 186).

32

For discussions, see Wilson & Zigelbaum (1983, pp. 73–76); Sparr et al. (1987); Pentland & Dwyer
(1985, pp. 407–410).

33

Bremner et al. (1996).

34

Id.; Friedman (2006); Lasko et al. (1994).

35

Carroll et al. (1985); Chemtob et al. (1997); Chemtob et al. (1994).

36

Wilson & Zigelbaum (1983, p. 74).

37

As mentioned above in Introduction, in considering this question, I set aside cases where PTSD-related
disability is so extreme that the person suffering from it can avoid criminal liability altogether. This Article
is only about those who are capable enough to be held criminally responsible.
38
See, e.g., State v. Bilke, 781 P.2d 28, 30 (Ariz. 1989) (en banc) (‘‘Had the sentencing judge been aware
that a mental disease known as PTSD existed, that defendant suffered from it as a direct result of his
outstanding military service in Vietnam, and that the disorder was a causative factor leading to the commission of the crimes, he might well have sentenced defendant differently.’’); Kathleen Kreller, Iraq War
Veteran George Nickel Won’t Go to Prison for Armed Standoff with Police Last Summer, Idaho Statesman,
Apr. 6, 2010 (quoting the trial judge during sentencing a defendant for a firearms offense as saying that
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not take much imagination to link PTSD to the question of criminal responsibility. If it is
indeed the case that PTSD has the effect of diminishing one’s capacity to control one’s
own behavior, it seems that, at least under one standard account of criminal responsibility,39 it should reduce one’s culpability for conduct committed while one’s self-control is
compromised even if it is not so compromised that one ought to be acquitted.40
The issue, however, may not be so straightforward. Consider the following accounts:
Case 1:
John reported … flashbacks … John compared these flashbacks to a running movie
of events surrounding the [traumatic incident]. He remarked upon the vividness and
clarity of the images. He estimated that the flashbacks could persist from a matter of
minutes up to one hour and reported a frequency of approximately twice a week
during the night, plus two or three episodes during the day. The flashbacks that
occurred during the day were fleeting …, while those that occurred during the night
generally persisted from between half-an-hour to an hour and were particularly
resistant to his attempt to distract his thoughts elsewhere … John was adamant that
these images were unwelcome, involuntary, … and caused him considerable distress.
Case 2:
CH had weekly nightmares of the [traumatic incident], intrusive images of the
stabbing, and flashbacks and panic when exposed to related stimuli … and psychogenic amnesia relating to aspects of [the incident]. When thinking about the
attack, she experienced severe anxiety, low mood, and guilt. She avoided all [incident]-related stimuli including using sharp kitchen knives, reading about stabbings,
…, going to sleep for fear of nightmares, and watching films with knife scenes.
Case 3:
Following the [traumatic incident], R reported … re-experiencing the [incident] in
repetitive flashbacks and nightmares. He would become physically agitated and
anxious, commonly drinking alcohol ‘‘to the point where I was oblivious.’’ … R
experienced a recurrent flashback of a single image of the [incident] and a repetitive
nightmare … He reported that the vividness of the images was the most distressing
aspect. [H]e suffered from anxious arousal, defensive avoidance, intrusive symptoms, depressed mood and self-destructive behaviors.
Now imagine that John, CH, and R, who have been suffering from these symptoms,
commit crimes, and that that these PTSD symptoms arise from their deployment as
members of the military in combat zones. Should their PTSD symptoms mitigate their
culpability? It seems that what we have here are typical fact patterns that give rise to
PTSD-based arguments for mitigation for offenders with military service backgrounds.
But these quotes are not from military veterans. They are from those who have PTSD
symptoms arising from their past criminal offenses. John raped and strangled a woman,41

Footnote 38 continued
‘‘[b]ecause he served his country honorably and courageously, he has developed some significantly bad
conditions with his alcoholism …’’).
39

Hart (1968, pp. 136–157).

40

See, e.g., Giardino (2009, p. 2975); Shein (2010, p. 48).

41

Kruppa (1991, p. 401).
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CH killed a co-worker in a fit of anger,42 and R killed a person as a hitman.43 If these
people—those who suffer from PTSD symptoms arising from their own criminal activities44—commit new crimes, should their PTSD symptoms mitigate their culpability? It
does not seem that they should.
And why not? It seems that the source of one’s PTSD influences how we evaluate the
relationship between PTSD factors and criminal behavior. Is this a mistake? As discussed
above, if PTSD lessens one’s capacity to control one’s behavior, it seems that one suffering
from its symptoms has reduced culpability if such symptoms have contributed to one’s
criminal activities. But the issue is more complicated than that. Sometimes in criminal law,
how one has behaved in the past can cast a shadow on how one behaves at a later point
even if the behavior at the later point may be entirely or partially blameless.
In intoxication cases, for instance, a person who committed a criminal act while
intoxicated may not be able to use his diminished capacity as an excuse if it resulted from
his voluntary partaking of alcohol.45 Similarly, in epileptic seizure cases, a person who
loses control over his or her behavior because of a medical or psychiatric condition may be
held responsible for such involuntary conduct if the behavior was foreseeable and could
have been prevented through self-medication or avoidance of dangerous situations at a
prior time.46 Some of these cases, especially in the intoxication context, are controversial
chiefly because it seems wrong to treat all ingestion of intoxicants as reckless.47 However,
the basic idea that one may be held responsible for what one does while intoxicated by
going back in time and identifying the culpable event is not problematic.48
There are also examples in criminal law where certain affirmative defenses are made
unavailable if the defendant himself has brought about the condition that made it necessary
or unavoidable to commit the crime. So, for instance, a person cannot invoke the selfdefense defense if he was the initial aggressor who started the cycle of physical violence,
thereby necessitating an act of violence to defend himself.49 Similarly, a person who
culpably creates an emergency cannot invoke the necessity defense after resorting to
criminal acts to choose the lesser evil in the emergency.50 Neither can a person who places
himself in a situation where he would likely be coerced to commit a crime raise the duress
defense.51 These cases, too, are controversial because some of the actual provisions can be
either too narrow or too wide.52 However, it is widely accepted that one who would
otherwise have an affirmative defense should sometimes be denied the defense because of
his role in creating the difficult situation.
In these criminal law doctrines, different moral intuitions seem to be doing the normative work. One intuition is that a person who, at t1, creates a reasonably foreseeable risk
42

Rogers et al. (2000, p. 514).

43

Pollock (2000, p. 179).

44

For more discussion of criminals suffering from PTSD caused by their own behaviors, see, for example,
MacNair (2005, pp. 60–63); Kruppa et al. (1995).
45

See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.08(2).

46

People v. Decina, 138 N.E.2d 799 (1956).

47

Dimock (2011, p. 12).

48

Id. p. 17.

49

LaFave (2010, § 10.4(e)).

50

Id. § 10.1(d)(6).

51

Robinson (1985, p. 11).

52

Id. pp. 3–7.
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of himself doing something undesirable at t2 may be held responsible for his actions at t2,
even if what he does at t2 would otherwise be excusable or justifiable, because his original
creation of risk at t1 is culpable. A person who gets drunk at a bar when he knows he has to
drive home afterwards and a person who gets into a car knowing that he is subject to
epileptic seizures can be held responsible for crashing their cars while unconscious due
to their respectively diminished faculties.
Another intuition is that a person who, at t1, behaves in a certain undesirable manner
that brings about negative consequences has ‘‘unclean hands’’ and can be held responsible
for harms that he newly creates at t2 in his attempts to contain such negative consequences,
even if his attempts at t2 ultimately minimize the amount of harm. The ‘‘unclean hands’’
idea can be broader than the foreseeable risk creation idea because, for example, the
particular risk of certain negative consequences at t2 may not be reasonably foreseeable at
t1. So, for instance, if a man rapes a woman in his apartment on a high floor, and the
oppressiveness of the environment drives the rape victim to jump out the window and die,
the rapist can bear responsibility for the death even if the particular victim’s reactions may
have taken him (and a hypothetical reasonable observer) by surprise.53 Now, let’s say that
the rapist knows that if his victim jumps out the window, she will fall on and likely kill
several children playing directly underneath the window, and that in order to save the
children’s lives he prevents her jump by shooting her. It seems doubtful that he can then
raise a defense of others or necessity defense for the shooting, even though he may have
done the right thing by saving the children’s lives.
The principle that the law should not permit one to ‘‘profit by his own fraud, or to take
advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire
property by his own crime,’’ in the words of the court deciding Riggs v. Palmer, seems
relevant here, too.54 Riggs, a case made famous by Ronald Dworkin’s discussion,55 was
about a person who attempted to inherit property from his murder victim, and it was
decided on the basis that one should not be allowed to benefit from his own wrongdoing.
The controversy over whether criminals should be able to profit from writing books about
their experience as criminals also is partially based on this idea. The laws that prevent
assertions of the self-defense defense to aggressors or the duress defense for those who join
criminal enterprises seem to get some normative support from this idea that one should not
be permitted to ‘‘take advantage of his own wrong’’ as well.
So what we have here is a cluster of related of ideas about the ways in which one’s past
behavior can shape our normative responses to the current behavior. Such ideas may
explain why we would not be sympathetic to a criminal who seeks to mitigate his punishment by pointing at PTSD symptoms when the PTSD originates from his own past
criminal conduct. I should clarify, however, that I am making the doctrinal analogies here
only for the purpose of illustration. The discussion here is not meant to suggest that the
question of evaluating offenders suffering from PTSD can be answered simply by
extracting an abstract idea from these doctrines and applying it to a new context. After all,
these examples are all different from one another. What we need instead is a separate,
independent principle for the military veterans context that bears a family resemblance to
these other doctrines and draws its appeal partly from the intuitions that underlie them.

53
Cf. Stephenson v. State, 179 N.E. 633 (1932). This conclusion is controversial, and there may be a debate
over whether the suicide victim’s actions are foreseeable.
54

22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889).

55

Dworkin (1986, pp. 15–21).
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Such a relevant principle here may be this: as a general matter, a person’s PTSD does
not mitigate his culpability if he has acquired his PTSD through his own culpable conduct.
A principle like this would explain why we may be reluctant to reduce culpability of
ordinary offenders, like John, CH, and R, who suffer from PTSD from their past criminal
conduct.56 So, the important question for our purposes is whether we could think about
military offenders’ supposed mitigation on the basis of PTSD in the same way. One may
simply deny the analogy on the ground that veterans’ traumas come from a socially
valuable activity, whereas ordinary criminals’ traumas arise from socially undesirable
activities. It seems, however, that this response is too quick. The mere existence of a
category of crimes called ‘‘war crimes’’ should be an indication that the matter is not so
simple. Military veterans’ traumas may arise from activities of varying moral significance,
and we may accordingly arrive at varying conclusions as to the appropriateness of treating
their traumas as culpability reducers. In order to make headway into this issue, we need to
consider the ways in which we morally evaluate soldiers’ behaviors.
PTSD and Culpability of Soldiers
Consider the example of the Nazi German Einsatzgruppen, also known as ‘‘mobile killing
units.’’57 Einsatzgruppen were killing squads charged with killing Jews and others. They
engaged in mass killings throughout Europe, usually by shooting,58 and are thought to be
responsible for rounding up and killing one million Jews throughout the war.59 And there
are some indications that some members of the group found the process of systematic
killings of Jews to be traumatizing.60 Rudolf Hoess, the commandant of Auschwitz, wrote
in his autobiography that ‘‘[m]any members of the Einsatzgruppen, unable to endure
wading through blood any longer, had committed suicide,’’ that some had ‘‘gone mad,’’
and that ‘‘[m]ost of the members of these commandos had to rely on alcohol when carrying
out their horrible work.’’61 Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, one of the officers directing
these killing squads is reported to have suffered from ‘‘hallucinations connected with the
shootings of Jews which he himself carried out.’’62
All of these are classic PTSD symptoms. It certainly seems credible that those who go
through various towns, round up innocent civilians, murder masses of them, and bury them
into hastily dug graves would have some serious psychological issues afterwards, to say the
least. But if such psychological conditions contribute to further criminality, perhaps by
way of drug or alcohol abuse, by these people in a more tranquil, postwar everyday setting,
would it make sense to think that their PTSD symptoms mitigate their culpability for the
later crimes? It seems bizarre to believe that those whose current PTSD symptoms can be
traced to their execution of atrocities should be considered less culpable simply because
they have PTSD symptoms that contribute to current criminal activities.
Is the case of the Nazi killing unit instructive for our topic? Some might argue that the
degree of evil is so exceptional in these cases that we should not draw any general lessons.
56
Again, as discussed in Introduction, if one’s disability is serious enough to negate criminal liability
altogether, the source of the disability should not make a difference.
57

See generally Hilberg (2003, pp. 275–408).

58

Id. pp. 327–328.

59

Earl (2009, p. 7).

60

See Hilberg (2003, p. 337); see also Rhodes (2002, pp. 215–228).

61

Hoess (2000, p. 148); see also Earl (2009, pp. 165–178).

62

Höhne (1970, pp. 363–366).

123

294

Crim Law and Philos (2013) 7:285–307

Perhaps that is the case, but what the Nazi example shows is that we cannot evade the issue
of the source of one’s trauma and its moral character when thinking about the significance
of PTSD on a person’s culpability, even if we are dealing with wartime activities. The
relevant question then becomes how we should evaluate soldiers’ activities that give rise to
PTSD when we morally evaluate veterans with military backgrounds.
Things that soldiers do in situations like these do not materialize in isolation. Individual
moral evaluations of soldiers necessitate a moral understanding of the wars that they
participate in. Traditionally, wars are evaluated along two separate moral metrics, one
having to do with reasons for going to war (jus ad bellum) and the other having to do with
the manner in which such wars are fought (jus in bello).63 The Nazis in the example above
are in violation of both because Germany was an unjust aggressor during the war and
fighting the war by killing civilians—indeed by committing genocide—is in violation of
rules that govern wartime practices.
PTSD and Jus in Bello
Perhaps the most important jus in bello principles are the principle of discrimination
between legitimate and illegitimate targets and the principle of non-combatant immunity.
Some of the war crimes listed in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court are
as follows: ‘‘[i]ntentionally directing attacks against the civilian population,’’ ‘‘torture or
inhuman treatment,’’ ‘‘[c]omitting outrages against personal dignity,’’ and willful killing of
those protected under the Geneva Conventions such as prisoners of war.64 One of many
reasons we may be unsympathetic to the Nazis in the particular example given above is
that they were in clear violation of jus in bello principles like these.65 Could we apply the
same intuition to at least those American soldiers whose post deployment criminal
behavior is rooted in PTSD arising from acts of atrocities they themselves perpetrated?
It would be a gross mistake to equate American troops with the Nazis, but we must at
the same time be careful not to fall into a state of moral complacency just because
Americans’ acts are not as depraved as that of the Nazis. In fact, it is unfortunately the case
that the American military is not immune from credible allegations of war crimes. The
most well-known case is the Abu Ghraib abuse of prisoners, where American soldiers beat
and sexually humiliated Iraqi detainees,66 but there are other publicized cases, such as: the
exploits of the ‘‘kill team,’’ which was a group of American soldiers in Afghanistan who, in
2010, killed unarmed Afghan civilians for fun and staged them to look like legitimate
combat killings during the war in Afghanistan;67 Operation Iron Triangle, during which
American soldiers killed unarmed Iraqi detainees, apparently following an order to kill any
military-age male during an operation to search for insurgents, and in one case killing Iraqi
detainees by first freeing them and then shooting them as they ran away;68 the ‘‘Baghdad
canal killings,’’ an incident in which soldiers shot and killed four handcuffed and blindfolded Iraqi detainees and then pushed them into a canal in Baghdad in 2007;69 and the
63

Walzer (2006a, p. 21).

64

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8.

65

For an account of the Einsatzgruppen trials after the war, see generally Earl (2009).

66

See Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, New Yorker, May 10, 2004.

67

See William Yardley, Calvin Gibbs Convicted of Killing Civilians in Afghanistan, NY Times, Nov. 10,
2011; William Yardley, Soldier Gets 24 Years for Killing 3 Afghan Civilians, NY Times, Mar. 23, 2011.
68

See Raffi Khatchadourian, The Kill Company, New Yorker, July 6, 2009.

69

Paul von Zielbauer, American Soldier Is Found Guilty in Iraqi Killings, NY Times, April 15, 2009.

123

Crim Law and Philos (2013) 7:285–307

295

‘‘Haditha incident,’’ where marines killed 24 Iraqi civilians, apparently in retaliation for a
roadside bombing, in 2005 in the city of Haditha.70
These sorts of incidents are terrible atrocities that are likely traumatizing for not only
the victims but also the perpetrators.71 Some of these perpetrators, suffering from PTSD,
may find themselves being led to criminal activities. But if a person’s PTSD symptoms can
be traced to these sorts of wrongful acts committed by himself, his culpability should not
be reduced. One tentative conclusion we may draw from these observations is that one’s
PTSD does not mitigate his culpability for his crime if those PTSD symptoms have arisen
from his own perpetration of atrocities during war, such as intentionally killing civilians,
torturing detainees, or similar mistreatments of combatants and noncombatants.
There may be a question as to whether this conclusion affects a large number of
veterans or just a few. The answer is that we do not know. There may be many incidents
like them that we never learn about, or, alternatively, there may not be many more than the
reported cases. There are, however, reasons to pay attention to PTSD cases arising from
atrocities perpetrated by American soldiers.
First, most veterans who return from war zones do not turn out to be criminals.72
Second, there are indications that the existence of PTSD symptoms is highly correlated
with veterans’ criminal behavior.73 Third, several studies have found a link between
participation in atrocities and both PTSD and post deployment criminality. One study of
Vietnam veterans, for example, reported that ‘‘warzone abusive violence,’’ which the
authors defined as ‘‘warzone violence that, from a military point of view, is considered
unnecessary,’’ is a predictor of PTSD and post deployment violence to self, spouse, and
others.74 Another study of Vietnam veterans reported that participation in atrocities,
defined as ‘‘torture, mutilation, or severe mistreatment of military personnel or civilians,’’75 ‘‘conferred a uniquely strong risk for posttraumatic stress disorder.’’76 Finally,
there is at least some anecdotal evidence that intentional, unjustified killing of civilians in
Iraq and Afghanistan by American troops happens and goes unreported.77
These studies combined together still do not give us an estimate of the number of people
affected by the analysis given here. At the same time, while it is probably not the case that
most offenders with military backgrounds have participated in acts of atrocities, given the
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links between participation in atrocities, PTSD, and post deployment criminality, it would
be misguided to ignore the issue of how to think about this relationship. And if we do not
feel particularly sympathetic to the Nazis who complain of psychological trauma, then we
should similarly subscribe to the notion that those who participate in atrocities in Iraq or
Afghanistan and later suffer from PTSD that in turn leads to criminal behaviors are not any
less culpable despite their PTSD symptoms.
Should it make a difference that in many of these cases, there is likely a degree or
coercion, either in the form of superior orders78 or of duress79? It should make a difference,
depending on the facts of the case, but it should also be kept in mind that the superior
orders defense and the duress defense for war crimes are limited. Although it is controversial, the duress defense has been held to be unavailable against a charge of murder in
this setting.80 The defense of superior orders also is limited. The International Tribunals for
former Yugoslavia or Rwanda did not regard it as a proper defense,81 and while the Rome
Statute allows it as a defense, it is available only if the defendant was unaware at the time
of the act that the ‘‘order was unlawful’’ and only if the order was ‘‘not manifestly
unlawful.’’82 Such limited availability of defenses of duress and superior orders in the
context of war crimes reflects the underlying moral sense that when one is pressured to
commit serious moral wrongs, one is morally required to resist such pressures.83 Those
who fail to resist, it seems then, should be held responsible for their actions and the
consequences of their actions, including symptoms of PTSD that may lead to commit
further crimes.84 After all, the Nazi defendants in the Nuremberg trial of Einsatzgruppen
leaders (unsuccessfully) invoked the defense of superior orders, too.85
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PTSD and Jus ad Bellum
Even if a side fighting in a war strictly adheres to all jus in bello principles, it can still be
acting wrongfully if it lacks just cause for its use of force. The Charter of the United
Nations articulates the just cause requirement by prohibiting States from using ‘‘threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State’’86 albeit
while preserving ‘‘the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs’’ against a State.87 Although we are entering a more controversial territory,
yet another reason we may be unsympathetic to the Einsatzgruppen killers is that they were
participating in an unjust war as aggressors, and it is appropriate to describe them as a
group of criminal thugs attacking people with no justification. And if we apply the principle that those who engage in wrongful acts should be held responsible for the consequences, we may conclude that soldiers who participate in unjust wars do not have reduced
culpability even if their criminal behavior is traceable to PTSD that they acquired from
their military activities.
How does this thought apply to American soldiers returning from, say, Iraq or
Afghanistan? It seems to follow that in order to evaluate the blameworthiness of veterans
who commit crimes, we must first decide whether the wars that they participated in can be
defended on moral grounds. While I will not address the question whether the Iraq and
Afghanistan wars are just wars in this Article, a typical combination of views is that the
2003 war in Iraq is unjust and that the war in Afghanistan may have started out as just in
2001 but that its moral defensibility is increasingly doubtful.88 Let’s assume that these
views are correct. If we further subscribe to the view that soldiers who participate in unjust
wars and later develop symptoms of PTSD due to the wars should be held fully responsible
for the crimes they commit, then veterans from the Iraq war are not eligible for PTSDbased sentencing discounts whereas those from the Afghanistan war may or may not be
depending on when they participated in the war.
Many will resist this line of reasoning, but why? If members of group A attack members
of group B with no just cause, and members of group B defend themselves by attacking
members of group A, then members of A are criminals, and they do not have the right to
counterattack B’s violent response in self-defense.89 If members of both groups, due to the
harrowing experience of being in a violent conflict, develop PTSD symptoms that lead to
criminal activities, it seems that the members of group B, the victims, have a stronger claim
to reduced culpability than members of group A, the aggressors, who should have no
analogous claim.
One of those who would object is Michael Walzer, who has argued that we ‘‘draw a line
between the war itself, for which soldiers are not responsible, and the conduct of the war,
for which they are responsible, at least within their own sphere of the activity.’’90 This
principle applies even to the Nazi military for Walzer, and he speaks approvingly of Erwin
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Rommel because while he was ‘‘one of Hitler’s generals, … he did not shoot prisoners.’’91
If this view is true, then the fact that a soldier participated in an aggressive war does not
reflect badly on him. If the Einsatzgruppen members have PTSD, we may not be sympathetic to them, but that is not because of their participation in a war of aggression but
solely because of their murder of civilians, according to this view. Something like Walzer’s
position is the conventional view.
If the conventional view is true, then even those who participate on the aggressor’s side
in unjust wars can have reduced culpability on the basis of their military service related
PTSD. It seems that there are a few recurring arguments in favor of the conventional view,
and those arguments may be organized in terms of different mental states.
First, a soldier may believe that a war is unjust, or that there is a substantial risk that it is
unjust, but participate in it anyway because he or she is under duress, superior orders, and
peer pressure,92 and also may face punishment for desertion,93 absence without leave,94
disobedience of orders,95 and dereliction of duty.96 A soldier in this category may participate in unjust wars reluctantly and unwillingly because he feels coerced to do so. Call
this the ‘‘duress argument.’’
Second, a soldier may believe that the war he or she is participating in is just simply
because their political leaders have said so. Such beliefs may be reasonable. Whether a war
is just or not is often controversial, uncertain, and shifting over time, and it may be
reasonable for the soldiers to believe their political leaders, given the limited information
the soldiers have. Even if it turns out that their belief is mistaken, their participation may be
justified in the same way a reasonable but mistaken act of self-defense in the individual
self-defense context may be justified.97 Call this the ‘‘epistemic argument.’’
Third, a soldier may either lack beliefs one way or the other on the matter or set aside
his or her personal beliefs, deeming them to be irrelevant. Some may argue that such a
soldier is still justified in participating in unjust wars for the following reason. The military
is an important institution, vital for national security, which is of paramount importance for
obvious reasons. In order for the military to function well, it has to be organized hierarchically, and there has to be a clear chain of command and a division of labor among its
members. The task of deciding whether to engage in a military conflict is reserved for
political leaders, and the soldiers cannot substitute their private judgments for the judgment
of the government officials. Because of this duty of soldiers to obey the orders given to
them, participating in a conflict, even if it is unjust, may be morally required for soldiers.98
Call this the ‘‘duty to obey’’ argument.
The duress argument must be evaluated while keeping in mind the consequences of
refusing service and comparing their seriousness to the gravity of what one is frequently
asked to do in an unjust war. The consequences of disobeying can certainly be
substantial. According to one study, the average punishment for the crime of desertion is
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26.35 months.99 That number may sound low, given that the maximum punishment
allowed for the crime of desertion is the death penalty, if it happens in time of war.100
However, the number actually overstates the seriousness of consequences for deserters, as
it appears that deserters are rarely punished,101 let alone receive the death penalty, even if
the desertions happen during war. The last time someone was executed for the crime of
desertion was in 1945,102 and a more typical consequence, judging from what happened
during the Iraq War, is to receive an ‘‘other than honorable’’ discharge.103 On the other side
of the ledger, the consequences of giving into the pressure to fight in an unjust war are
grave: for those in direct combat, the consequence is to kill those who should not be killed,
and for those not in direct combat, it is to aid and abet such killings. As we saw when we
considered jus in bello principles, when one is pressured to commit serious moral wrongs,
one is morally required to resist such pressures, even if it is difficult to do so. For these
reasons, the duress argument seems weak.104
Whether the epistemic argument is available or not for servicemen will depend on
individual situations. Some soldiers may in fact believe that the war is unjust but participate in it anyway for whatever professional or personal reasons, and such people cannot
argue that they believed that the war was just. Second, a soldier’s actual belief that the war
is just would also have to be reasonable, and whether it is or not would depend on the
information available in a given case. These two conditions would have to be met for a
soldier to show that his participation in an unjust war is justified.
What about the duty to obey argument? We should start by noting that the duty to obey
is not absolute, and it may be overridden by a competing consideration if the reason to
disobey is of a correct kind and of sufficient strength. At least three things follow from this
feature of the duty to obey. First, it is morally irresponsible for a soldier to obey without
giving a thought to whether what he is being asked to do is morally permissible,105 unless
one can justify one’s lack of thoughts on such matters on the basis of reasonableness, in
which case his position should be evaluated as a form of the epistemic argument discussed
above. Second, similarly, if a solider believes that obedience is justified in a given case
because the war is just, then whether the obedience argument works or not turns on the
reasonableness of his belief that the war is just, which, again, brings us back to the
epistemic argument. Finally, if a soldier believes that a war is unjust and that he would be
perpetrating violence against those who should not be attacked, then the gravity of the acts
contemplated would likely create a permission, and perhaps even a duty, to disobey.106 The
upshot is that a successful pure duty to obey argument for participating in an unjust war—
separate from the epistemic argument—is bound to be rare.
So, it appears that a soldier may be justified in participating in an unjust war only when
he actually and reasonably believes that he is participating in a just war. In such cases, we
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cannot say that the PTSD that is brought on by his participation in an unjust war is a result
of culpable behavior on his part, and his PTSD symptoms can then reduce his culpability.
We can therefore conclude that a veteran’s PTSD should not mitigate when his PTSD is
traced to his participation in an unjust war, unless he actually and reasonably believed that
the war was just.107
State Responsibility and Standing to Blame
From the discussion in Part II, the picture that emerges is as follows. The strongest claim
for PTSD to mitigate culpability is for those offenders whose PTSD symptoms arose from
their participation in a just war and did not come about as a result of their participation in
atrocities during war. The second strongest claim is for those whose PTSD symptoms came
about from an unjust war that they actually and reasonably believed was just, where their
symptoms were also not related to any atrocities committed during the war.
The position we have arrived at is thus complex. Yet, it is still incomplete. Among those
whose PTSD symptoms cannot be traced to their perpetration of atrocities but arose from
their participation in unjust wars without justification, another reason to punish less exists.
The reason does not concern their reduced culpability but instead centers around the State’s
involvement in the production of their criminality.
As I have implicitly assumed throughout this Article, when the State punishes, it
blames, condemns, and stigmatizes the offenders. Two things follow from this. First, the
State must ensure that its acts of condemning are fair to, and are in fact deserved by, their
recipients. Thus, the discussion about offenders with military backgrounds far has focused,
up until now, on this question of their blameworthiness. Second, even if the intended
recipients of the State’s blaming are blameworthy, the State’s standing to blame—and to
punish—may be undermined for various reasons. One of those reasons is that the State
itself is partly responsible for the wrongdoing that it seeks to condemn.108
The most obvious aspect of the State involvement in the soldiers’ participations in
unjust war is that the soldiers are not out there on their own. First, they engage in acts of
violence in their official capacity, as extensions of the State itself. Second, soldiers are
placed in the types of situations—such as combat situations—that are likely to give rise to
107
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symptoms of PTSD by the State itself. That is, a foreseeable consequence of sending
soldiers to battlefields is that many of them would end up psychologically damaged. War
can be, in short, criminogenic for those susceptible. If the soldiers, while working as agents
of the State in places and situations designated by the State as their mission sites, develop
symptoms of PTSD, which drive them toward criminal activities post-deployment, the
State’s standing to condemn their behavior is undermined because the State itself has
caused the conditions leading to the crimes.
Also, if one of the reasons soldiers participate in unjust wars is because of their willingness to obey even commands that lead them to unjust wars, the State’s standing to
blame soldiers for consequences that follow from their obedience is undermined. One
mechanism by which soldiers act as agents of the State is through a system of commands.
Such commands are mandatory, accompany a strict system of hierarchy and a clear chain
of commands in the military, and disobedience within the military is an offense that can
result in court martial and punishment. Thus, a State that orders its soldiers to participate in
unjust wars cannot then turn around and blame the soldiers for having followed the
commands.109
The State’s involvement is in fact deeper than a mere issuance of commands backed up
with sanctions. There is a powerful ethos of obedience that runs throughout the institutions
of the military, and indeed the military actively cultivates a culture of obedience.110 As Jeff
McMahan observes:
In most military organizations, the ability of soldiers to engage in autonomous
reflection and deliberation about the content of their orders is also deliberately and
systematically sabotaged. They are subjected to intensive conditioning and indoctrination, to endless drills, and to processes intended to efface their individuality and
subvert their autonomy. The suppression of individual identity is achieved in part
through shaving of the heads of males and making all soldiers wear the same uniform. They are all to look and act in exactly the same ways. Their wills are broken
through intimidation, bullying, and humiliation by their instructors, through demands
for repeated public displays of deference and submissiveness, and so on. The aim is
to convert them into largely unreflective instruments of the wills of their superiors.111
There are many reasons of efficiency and effectiveness to cultivate such a culture. But
one of the most powerful reasons perhaps is that soldiers are frequently required to do
something that people generally find very difficult to do: kill other human beings. In the
often discussed study by General S. L. A. Marshall, it was discovered that only about
15–20 of every hundred American soldiers in a battle with enemies consciously fired at the
other side.112 The study is controversial, but its basic findings that soldiers are extremely
reluctant to kill and that they try to find ways to avoid shooting even if the situations they
are in call for them to shoot are accepted as valid.113 The lesson of the Marshall study was
that an important part of the military training had to be about overcoming such human
inhibitions to kill, and by all accounts, the military has achieved some success in doing
109
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so.114 This is yet another way in which the State has involved itself in inducing soldiers to
act in ways that are potentially immoral—thereby burdening them with a kind of moral
risk, which undermines its own standing to blame the soldiers for adverse consequences of
their willingness to obey and kill.115
Assuming that this analysis is correct and the State’s moral standing to blame can be
undermined for various reasons, there are still a number of questions. First, these arguments appear to be especially strong in cases where the State is culpable in the sense that it
has carried out an unjust war. The State has then contributed to the veterans’ criminality
and has done so by engaging in an unjust conflict. Thus, its moral standing seems particularly compromised.116 This observation raises the following question: do these arguments apply even when the State is involved in a just war? If it is the case that the moral
standing to blame is not undermined when a State does not act culpably, then it seems that
these arguments should not apply if the war is just. This may not make a difference in the
end since offenders whose criminal behavior can be traced to their military service in a just
war are eligible for a discount according to the analysis above.
However, it seems to me that the State’s standing can be compromised even if the State
has not done anything wrong. Even if the State engages only in morally justified conflicts
and even if we grant that the State’s efforts to train soldiers to obey orders and overcome
their inhibitions to killing are not culpable, the State’s total, intimate, and intrusive
involvement in shaping the soldiers’ psyche and day-to-day lives makes it difficult to
declare that the State is not to share the blame in soldiers’ criminal behaviors, no matter the
justness of the source of the criminality.117 In other words, to the extent that the State has
114
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government as their own government. The only government whose moral standing to blame has been
undermined by its own complicity of atrocities committed by Nazi soldiers is the Nazi government, which
no longer exists. The closest candidate would be the current German government, and even if there were a
viable argument that the current German government has no standing to judge its own war criminals, reasons
of transitional justice—a need to make a decisive break with the past in order to reconcile oneself with its
own past—militate against any gesture that would be construed as sympathy for Nazi war criminals. Plus, to
the extent that the current German government cannot make a complete break from its Nazi past, the fact
that it has been scrupulous about blaming itself for its past deeds at least partially restores its moral standing
to blame. Cf. Duff (2010, pp. 139–140); Tadros (2009, p. 410).
116
However, as discussed in supra note 115, in exceptional situations, for reasons of transitional justice,
where a State must distance itself from its predecessor in order for a polity to move forward, a State may be
right in not displaying any sign of impunity regarding wrongdoers from the previous regime. In such cases,
sentencing discounts may not be called for.
117
It should be kept in mind that the State’s standing to blame is not undermined by the mere fact that the
military training led one to become a criminal. The standing to punish argument here is limited to situations
where a veteran’s criminal activity is brought about due to PTSD symptoms stemming from his or her
military service. The reason this limitation is important is because the military may contribute to people’s
criminal activities in all kinds of ways that do not undermine the State’s standing to blame. For instance, the
military obviously trains people to be good at certain things (such as ability to shoot a gun), and some of the
skills or character traits that one may develop in the military may be useful for criminal activities. And it
seems odd to think that the State’s standing to blame is undermined just because the State has given a person
tools that happen to be useful for criminal activities. For instance, John Allen Muhammad, the ‘‘Beltway
Sniper,’’ was a Gulf War veteran who apparently used his skills as a marksman to go on a murder spree,
setting aside the question of whether his mental stability had to do with his experience during the war. See
Ian Urbina, Sniper Who Killed 10 Is Executed in Virginia, NY Times, Nov. 10, 2009; Byron Acohido and
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created and operated the military and turned individuals into those capable of killing
efficiently and deployed them into combat, the State must share the blame for some of the
foreseeable negative manifestations of such training and deployments, even if we cannot
say that the State has done anything wrong.118
Another question is whether the State’s standing to blame is so compromised with
regard to veterans that even those whose PTSD symptoms arise from participating in
atrocities—torture, intentional killing of civilians, etc.—cannot be criticized properly. The
answer here is no, at least assuming that the State has not commanded the soldiers to
engage in such wrongdoings. This is because there is a clear understanding among all
participants that the minute soldiers start flouting rules that govern their conduct during a
war, they are no longer acting within the scope of authorized violence. They cannot claim
to have acted as agents of the State; neither can they claim that they were ordered to do so
by the State. The jus in bello principles and the rules governing how to handle orders that
require them to violate jus in bello principles are part of their training.119 Therefore, the
arguments given above as to why the State’s moral standing to blame is compromised do
not generally apply here. Now, it is true that the State may be responsible for cultivating
traits in soldiers that make them more likely to submit even to illegal orders, but by
stressing the jus in bello rules and enforcing them, the State may immunize itself from the
forces that may undermine its moral standing to criticize.

Conclusion
This Article has defended the following propositions: First, if a person’s PTSD symptoms
contribute to his criminal behavior, the PTSD does not reduce his culpability if his PTSD
originally stemmed from his own culpable behavior. Second, a veteran’s PTSD does not
reduce his culpability if his PTSD arises from an instance of his violation of certain jus in
bello principles during a war. Third, a veteran’s PTSD does not mitigate if his PTSD is
traced to his participation in an unjust war, unless he actually and reasonably believed that
the war he was participating in was just. Fourth, even if a veteran’s participation in an
unjust war without suitable justification or excuse defeats the argument for culpability
reduction, he should not be punished to the full extent of his blameworthiness because the
State, through its involvement in the production of his criminality, has undermined its
standing to blame him.
There are two other arguments that I have not addressed. The first argument is mercy,120
and I will not address it here, partly because the idea of mercy seems capacious enough
to serve simply as a way of discussing multiple, all-things-considered grounds for
leniency.121 The second argument is what I have above called the ‘‘social contributions’’
Footnote 117 continued
Blake Morrison, Expert Marksman, Eager Student Lived as Vagabonds, USA Today, Oct. 25, 2002. See also
Forgey v. State, 886 N.E.2d 16, 24 (Ind. App. 2008) (noting that ‘‘many of Forgey’s actions during the
commission of the instant crimes appear to be attributable to his military training’’).
118

One implication of this argument, for those who are interested in implementation questions, is that
courts, when deciding whether to grant a sentencing discount for offenders with military backgrounds, may
bypass the vexing question as to whether a particular conflict is morally justified and still grant the discount,
simply because mitigation is called for whether the war that a veteran was involved in was just or not.
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See, e.g., DeSaussure (1994, p. 58); Eckhardt (2003, p. 440).
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See, e.g., Gardner (2011, p. 101). For a general discussion, see Duff (2007).
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See, e.g., Tasioulas (2011, pp. 45–48).
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argument. The standard justification that we saw in the Porter case has two parts. We
should treat veterans differently ‘‘in recognition of,’’ first, ‘‘their service,’’122 and, second,
‘‘the intense stress and mental and emotional toll’’ of combat.123 This Article has primarily
focused on the second factor, but the arguments made here have implications for the first
factor.
The first thing to note is that the analysis above shows the awkwardness of the idea of
describing military veterans as having contributed to the society. Those who have violated
jus in bello principles probably should not be described as having contributed in a positive
manner; in fact, it may be the opposite as they may have damaged the State’s standing in
the international community and its foreign relations. Those who should be honored
instead, some have argued, are those who, at great personal and professional risk, dissented
from certain practices, criticized certain policies, and reported on them.124
Those who have participated in unjust wars without justification, on the other hand, may
not have damaged the State in such an obvious manner but nevertheless have behaved in
ways that are contrary to the path the State ought to have been on by assisting the State to
go down an immoral path. And even if individual soldiers had justifications, if they have
participated in objectively wrongful acts, all they ought to receive is freedom from blame;
it seems odd to express gratitude to those who participated in a morally wrongheaded
activity.
These considerations highlight the deficiencies of the social contributions account as the
general justification of reduced punishments for veterans. The only veterans who may be
entitled to a gratitude-based mitigation are, then, those who participated justly in just wars.
Here it seems that the case for mitigation on this basis is still weak, but mainly for reasons
that have to do with the general problems of social contributions as a sentencing factor.
Namely, the institution of punishment should concern itself with individual acts and should
not as a general matter serve as a forum where some kind of social accounting examining a
person’s entire life takes place.125 However, fully defending this argument is beyond the
scope of this Article.126
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Porter, 130 S. Ct. at 455; see also Amir Efrati, Judges Consider New Factor at Sentencing: Military
Service, Wall St. J., Dec. 31, 2009 (quoting a judge stating that a criminal defendant ‘‘is to be credited for his
contributions to the United States Army, to his unit, and, in turn, to his country’’).
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See, e.g., Jameel Jaffer and Larry Siems, Honoring Those Who Said No, NY Times, April 27, 2011.
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Ashworth (2010, pp. 182–183).
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One way of taking one’s social contributions into account without turning the institution of punishment
into a forum to conduct an overall social accounting of a person’s entire life is by providing larger
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